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This paper assesses the likelihood of meeting the Millennium Development Goal of 
halving poverty by 2015 in Argentina, Chile, Paraguay and Uruguay. We simulate the 
poverty impact of changes in growth rates and redistributive policies, and trace the 
poverty consequences of various alternative economic scenarios using 
microeconometric decompositions. Sustainable and vigorous productivity growth 
seems to be a necessary condition to meet the poverty MDG by 2015 in Argentina, 
Paraguay and Uruguay. The required growth rate could be significantly lower if some 
modest well-targeted redistribution could be performed. In contrast to its neighbors, 
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1.  Introduction  
On September 2000, the world’s leaders agreed on the Millennium Development Goals 
(MDGs), committing their countries to exert stronger efforts to reduce poverty, improve 
education and health levels, achieve gender equality, and environmental sustainability. The 
first general MDG is to “eradicate extreme poverty and hunger”. In particular target 1 states 
the goal of halving poverty between 1990 and 2015.  
 
In this paper we discuss the likelihood for Argentina, Chile, Paraguay and Uruguay to reach 
the poverty-reduction MDG. In particular, we perform microsimulations to estimate the 
poverty impact of alternative economic changes. The paper contributes to the understanding 
of the channels through which the goal of meeting the poverty-reduction MDG can be met.  
 
We start by carrying out some simulations to find the growth rate and the redistributive 
effort needed to reach the MDG. By constructing isopoverty curves we explore the 
combinations of growth and redistribution that help the country meet the poverty reduction 
goal. We then perform some less mechanical exercises by simulating the poverty impact of 
changes in the income determinants, rather than changes in income itself. To implement 
this step we write and estimate income models, and use the coefficients to perform different 
types of simulations with microdata.  
 
The results suggest that sustainable and vigorous productivity growth seems to be a 
necessary condition to meet the poverty MDG by 2015 in Argentina, Paraguay and 
Uruguay. The required growth rate could be significantly lower if some modest 
redistribution could be carried out without significant efficiency losses. Increasing 
education, lowering unemployment and informality, increasing employment in non-
agricultural activities, and reducing fertility contribute to the reduction of poverty. 
However, in the simulations none of these scenarios alone allow the countries to attain the 
poverty MDG.  
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we make more precise the MDG 
of reducing poverty. We also discuss the current position of the four countries in the region 
in the road toward the poverty MDG. In section 3 we outline the methodology used to 
assess the likelihood of reaching the MDG by changing the growth rate and a redistribution 
parameter. Section 4 presents and discusses the results obtained for Argentina, Chile, 
Paraguay and Uruguay. In section 5 we outline the microeconometric simulation 
methodology to assess the impact of changes in some variables (education, unemployment, 
informality, employment structure and fertility) on household income, and in turn on 
  2poverty and inequality. Section 6 shows the results of these exercises for the countries in 
the Southern Cone. Section 7 closes with an assessment of the results.  
 
2.  The poverty MDG: definition and implementation  
The first general Millennium Development Goal is to “eradicate extreme poverty and 
hunger”. In particular target 1 states the goal of “halving, between 1990 and 2015, the 
proportion of people whose income is less than USD1 a day” at PPP values. In this section 
we discuss the definition of this goal in more depth, and present the current situation of 
Argentina, Chile, Paraguay and Uruguay in reference to that goal.  
 
The USD 1 a day at PPP prices is an international poverty line extensively used and 
computed by the World Bank (see World Bank Indicators, 2004). This poverty line is 
supposed to define the inability to pay for food needs. It is a value measured in 1985 
international prices and adjusted to local currency using purchasing power parities (PPP) to 
take into account local prices. The line has been recalculated in 1993 PPP terms at $1.0763 
a day (Chen and Ravallion, 2001).  
 
The USD1-a-day line was proposed in Ravallion et al. (1991), and was based on the actual 
official poverty lines in a sample of poor countries. For that reason the line may not be so 
relevant for upper-middle-income countries like Argentina, Chile and Uruguay, and even 
for a lower-middle-income country like Paraguay. For middle-income countries the USD-2-
a-day line is extensively used, and periodically presented in the World Development 
Indicators.  
 
One of the main objectives of the MDGs is to encourage governments to have the goals as a 
primary concern, using them as a benchmark to assess their policies. In most countries, 
included those in the region, the poverty monitoring is made in terms of an official poverty 
line, not an international one. Although the MDGs are stated in terms of an international 
line, they explicitly recognize the need to adapt the goals to country-idiosyncratic 
characteristics.  
 
For the reasons discussed above we define the poverty MDG in terms of four poverty lines: 
the international USD1 and USD2 a day at PPP, and the national official extreme and 
moderate poverty lines. In all cases we compute the poverty headcount ratio as the 
proportion of people whose household income is less than the poverty line.
1  
 
                                                 
1 The international comparisons use household per capita income, while the national statistics require 
computing household income per adult equivalent.  
  3The MDG requires halving poverty between 1990 and 2015. A problem in order to monitor 
this goal is that in some countries there is not a representative household survey in 1990 to 
estimate poverty. This is the case of Paraguay, where national reliable household surveys 
started to be carried out in the late 1990s.
2 A second problem arises if 1990 was a non-
typical year from an economic viewpoint. For instance, in 1990 Argentina was in the midst 
of a deep macroeconomic crisis. Poverty was particular high due to this factor, and in fact it 
dramatically fell in the following years when the crisis was overcome. The official 
moderate poverty headcount ratio in the Greater Buenos Aires was 32.9 in 1990 and 
dropped to almost half of that value in 1992 (17.8). It is clear that the likelihood of reaching 
the MDG by 2015 is very different if we take 1990 or 1992 as the baseline. In this paper we 
prefer to take as base a year close to 1990 that shows at least moderate macroeconomic 
stability. Although this criterion introduces arbitrariness in the decision, it should be 
noticed that the very choice of 1990 as the base year for the MDG is arbitrary. We find it 
more useful as a policy guide to choose a year of macroeconomic stability in case 1990 was 
a crisis (or particularly booming) year.  
 
Argentina and Uruguay have only urban surveys. For these two countries we express the 
MDG in terms of their urban population, since there are not reliable sources to expand the 
survey results to the whole country. Anyway, the bias from ignoring the rural population is 
probably small, since the urban population in these two nations is very large: more than 
85% of total population.   
 
  In what follows we provide the details of the definition of the poverty MDG in each 
country, and assessment of the advance towards that goal since the early 1990s.
3 In each 
case we present (i) the surveys used for monitoring poverty, (ii) the year taken as baseline, 
(iii) the poverty levels in that base year and the target levels for 2015, and (iv) the poverty 
level in the latest household survey.  
 
2.1. Argentina   
 
We compute poverty from the microdata of the Encuesta Permanente de Hogares (EPH). A 
major methodological change was implemented in 2003, including changes in the 
questionnaires and in the frequency of visits (see a companion paper Gasparini (2005b)). 
Since the consequences of this change on the measurement of variables is not yet well-
understood, we prefer in this paper to avoid using the available surveys carried out with the 
new methodology.  
                                                 
2 To a lesser extent this is also the problem of Argentina, since in 1990 the EPH had lower geographical 
coverage than today. 
3 UNDP has studied the advance towards the MDGs in several countries. The progress between 1990 and 
2000 is reported in http://hdr.undp.org/reports/global/2002/en/pdf/hdr_2002_feature_1_1.pdf 
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We take the year 1992 as the baseline year for the reasons discussed above. The official 
moderate poverty headcount ratio in the Greater Buenos Aires area increased 25.2 points 
between 1987 and 1989 as a consequence of a deep macroeconomic crisis that included a 
hyperinflation process. From 1989 to 1992 poverty fell 23.9 points, reaching a level similar 
to the beginning of the crisis. Poverty did not change very much in the following two years.  
We then take poverty in 1992 as the “equilibrium” rate of the early 1990s.   
 
The first panel in Table 2.1 shows the poverty headcount ratio in Argentina for the base 
year (1992), the target year in the MDGs (2015) and the year with the latest available 
survey (2003). In all cases we show poverty computed with four alternative poverty lines: 
USD1 a day, USD2 a day, extreme official and moderate official. Argentina has had a very 
disappointing performance in terms of poverty reduction. In fact, the country has moved 
away from the MDGs, since poverty has significantly risen between 1992 and 2003. In 
1992 poverty was 4.9 according to the USD2 line. The MDG for Argentina did not look as 
very ambitious: just reducing poverty 2.4 points. However, poverty increased reaching 23.5 
in 2003, making the MDG more difficult to attain. In the next 12 years, poverty will have to 
fall 21 points to reach the MDG. Table 2.2 indicates a required annual fall of 1.6 percentual 
points from 2004 to 2015 in order to meet the MDG, when computed using the USD 2 
poverty line. The same conclusions apply to the other lines.  
 
Naturally, the magnitude of the required fall depends on the poverty measure. While 
Argentina would need a fall in poverty of 7.2 points when using the USD1 poverty line (an 
annual fall of 0.6), the drop needed to achieve the MDG computed with the official 
moderate poverty line is greater (43.7 points, which implies an annual fall of 3.4 percentual 
points from 2004 to 2015). However, this does not necessarily imply that it would be more 
likely to reach the MDG with the USD1 line, since it is harder to reduce poverty from lower 
than from larger levels. In fact, poverty computed with the USD1 line fell 0.4 points 
between the EPH May 2003 and the EPHC of October-December 2003, i.e. less than the 
required annual 0.5 to meet the MDG, while in the same period poverty computed with the 
official moderate poverty line dropped 6 points, i.e. more than the required annual 3.3 
points.  
 
2.2. Chile   
 
Poverty is computed with the microdata of the CASEN survey. Although methodological 
changes have been introduced over the 1990s the poverty monitoring can be made with that 
survey (see Pizzolito, 2005 a, b). Unlike Argentina, 1990 seems a reasonable year to take as 
a base year. The second panel in Table 2.1 shows the poverty headcount ratio in Chile for 
the base year (1990), the target year in the MDGs (2015) and the year with the latest 
  5available survey (2000). Although the CASEN 2003 has been already processed, the dataset 
has not been released yet.  
 
In contrast to their neighbors in the Southern Cone, Chile has had a successful performance 
in terms of poverty reduction. In fact, the country has moved fast toward the MDGs, 
already meeting the poverty goal, or being close to meet it. In 1990 poverty was 20.0 
according to the USD2 line. The MDG of reducing poverty in 10 points was achieved in the 
period 1990-2000. In fact, according to preliminary reports of MIDEPLAN poverty went 
further down in the period 2000-2003. Table 2.1 shows that Chile still fell short of meeting 
the MDG in 2000, when computing poverty with the moderate official poverty line. 
However, according to MIDEPLAN poverty decreased 1.8 points between 2000 and 2003, 
thus reaching the MDG.  
 
2.3. Paraguay   
 
The monitoring of the poverty MDG in Paraguay faces serious problems (see Fazio (2005 
a,b)). As explained above, Paraguay did not have national surveys in the early 1990s, which 
implies the difficulty of obtaining non-debatable national poverty estimates for the base 
year 1990. Household surveys covered only the Greater Asunción, the main urban area in 
the country. According to several sources (MECOVI, 2001; DGEEC, 2002; and World 
Bank, 2003) the moderate official headcount ratio in the Greater Asunción was almost 
exactly the same in 1990 than in 2002. Since this is the only estimate we have for 1990, we 
then assume in this paper that national poverty in 1990 was the same as in 2002 for all 
poverty lines. There is evidence that there was not any improvement in the moderate 
official poverty indicator for Asunción from 1990 to 2002: we assume the same frustrating 
pattern for the rest of the country.
4  
 
Given that assumption, Paraguay is today at the same point as in 1990 to reach the poverty 
MDG, but with 13 years less to meet the goal. The moderate official poverty headcount 
ratio will have to fall 23.2 points from the value of the last household survey (EPH, 2002), 
which translates into an annual drop of 1.8 points from 2004 to 2015 (see Table 2.2). This 
estimate implies a significant effort in terms of poverty-reduction, even more when 
considering the disappointing past experience of the country.  
 
2.4. Uruguay  
 
We compute poverty from the microdata of the Encuesta Continua de Hogares (ECH) (see 
Winkler (2005 a, b) for methodological details). As explained above, although the ECH has 
                                                 
4 In fact there is evidence (see Fazio, 2005 a) that poverty increased between 1997 and 2002 in Asunción and 
in other urban and rural areas. 
  6only urban coverage, the fraction of rural population is low, s o  w e  t a k e  t h e  E C H  a s  
representative of the whole Uruguay. Alternatively the analysis could be interpreted as 
assessing the likelihood of meeting the MDGs in urban Uruguay. We take the year 1989 as 
the baseline year, since poverty in 1990 was higher than in the adjacent years (1988, 1989 
and 1991).
5 We then take poverty in 1989 as the “equilibrium” rate of the early 1990s.   
 
The last panel in Table 2.1 shows the poverty headcount ratio in Uruguay for the base year 
(1989), the target year in the MDGs (2015) and the year with the latest available survey 
(2003). Uruguay, as its neighbor Argentina, has had a disappointing performance in terms 
of poverty reduction. The country has moved away from the MDGs, since poverty has 
significantly risen between 1989 and 2003. In 1989 poverty was 27.6 according to the 
official moderate poverty line. The MDG required reducing poverty around 14 points. 
However, poverty increased 3.7 points between 1989 and 2003, making the MDG more 
difficult to attain: Uruguay has now less time to reach the poverty target, which in addition 
is now further away than it was 15 years ago. In the next 12 years, poverty will have to fall 
17.5 points to reach the MDG. Table 2.2 shows a required annual fall of 1.5 percentual 
points from 2004 to 2015 in order to meet the MDG, when poverty is computed using the 
moderate official poverty line.  
 
Since the headcount ratios for the other poverty lines are low, even after the increase in the 
last decade, the required annual changes to meet the MDG look small. However, as it was 
mentioned in the case of Argentina, lowering poverty from already low levels turns out to 
be particularly difficult.  
 
3.  Mechanical microsimulations  
We perform two types of simulation exercises: mechanical and microeconometric 
simulations. In the first type we change incomes, while in the second type we change the 
distribution of some of the income determinants (e.g. education).   
 
The starting point in each country is the latest income distribution available. We postulate 
several impulses and trace their impact on poverty. It should be stressed that these are 
rather statistical exercises, where after a proposed impulse, all parameters and individual 
characteristics are kept constant.  
 
It is common to consider poverty changes as the consequence of growth and redistribution. 
Poverty may fall as per capita income rises and/or as inequality falls. In this section we 
examine the poverty impact of economic growth and redistributive policies.  
                                                 
5 According to INE (2003) the moderate official headcount ratio was almost three points higher in 1990 than 
in 1988 and 1989, and 5 points higher than in 1991.  
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We model growth by multiplying household per capita income by a constant, thus 
assuming distributional neutral growth. This exercise tell us at what rate the economy 
should grow, with unchanged Lorenz curve, to meet the MDG.  
 
We also model two alternative distributive policies. In the first one we tax all income at the 
same rate and allocate the revenues in fix amounts per capita. This is the kind of exercise 
studied in Paes de Barros (2003) and Ferreira and Leite (2003). It can be shown that the fall 
in the Gini coefficient after this exercise is similar to the tax rate t. This simple 
redistributive policy, although not targeted to the poor, is not far from the actual fiscal 
system of some countries, where taxes are approximately proportional and social 
expenditures per capita do not substantially vary with income.
6  
 
The second  redistributive policy minimizes the fiscal cost of a given poverty reduction, as 
measured by the headcount ratio. In addition, uniform taxes (at a rate t) are only paid by the 
non-poor. This second policy is a lower bound in terms of fiscal cost of reducing the 
headcount ratio, since only the poor who are closer to the poverty line receive the transfer 
(i.e. those that need a smaller transfer to escape poverty), and they receive only the 
minimum amount needed to reach the poverty line. Although this policy would be probably 
undesirable (as the very poorest do not receive transfers), and difficult to implement (as it is 
perfectly targeted, with transfers depending on income), it is theoretically interesting as a 
lower bound for the fiscal effort to meet the MDG.
7 In both redistributive policies we 
assume no efficiency costs (or gains).     
 
These exercises allows us to construct isopoverty curves, that is combinations of 
distributionally-neutral growth rates g, and tax rates t that achieve a given poverty rate. 
These isopoverty curves are negatively-slope curves in the (t,g) space. The origin depicts 
the current situation: the farther the curve is from the origin, the lower the poverty rate. 
 
Suppose the poverty goal is to reach a headcount ratio equal to δP0 where P0 is the base 
year poverty rate, and δ<1 the goal in terms of poverty reduction. In the MDGs δ=0.5, and 
P0 is the poverty rate in the early 1990s. The key step to compute the isopoverty curves is 
to find the individual such that δP0 % of the population is poorer than him, and the rest 
richer. Analytically, that individual, labeled as l, has an income Yl such that   
 
                                                 
6 See Gasparini et al. (2001) for the case of Argentina. 
7 The transfers that maximize the poverty impact have a particular feature: they do not reach the very poorest. 
This bothering feature is driven by the index used to monitor the MDG –the headcount ratio–, and it does not 
show up with other indices (e.g. poverty gap or FGT(2)).  
  8(1)              ∫ =
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where f(Y) is the current income distribution. To attain a poverty level δP0 from the current 
income distribution, individual l’s income will have to reach the poverty line z. Incomes are 
modified through two channels: fiscal policy and neutral economic growth. For simplicity 
we explain the first redistributive policy considered: the government taxes incomes at a 
uniform rate t on top of the current tax system, and distributes the revenues in equal shares 
per capita e. We also assume neutral economic growth at an annual rate g. Equation (2) 
shows the combinations of g and fiscal policy (t, e) such that individual l reaches the 
poverty line in the goal year (2015 in the MDGs) 
 
(2) ( ) z e t g Y
n
l = + − + ) 1 ( ) 1 (  
where n labels the number of years from the current year to the goal year.  
 
The government budget constraint requires  
 
(3)             
n g t e ) 1 ( + = µ
 
where µ is mean current income. Combining (2) and (3) yields,   
 
(4)    () ( ) z g t t Y
n
l = + + − 1 ) 1 ( µ
 
Equation (4) defines the isopoverty curves: combinations of tax rates t and growth rates g 
that allow reaching the goal δP0 in n years. From (4) it is straightforward to find the tax rate 
as function of g 
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or the growth rate as a function of t 
 


















For each of the 4 countries of the Southern Cone we compute isopoverty curves using the 
four alternative definitions of poverty lines. In each case we show several curves, being that 
which corresponds to the MDG the most relevant one. This curve indicates the possible 
combinations of growth and redistribution leading to the poverty-reduction MDG.   
  9 
4.  Results for the mechanical microsimulations  
In this section we present the main results of applying the methodology outlined in section 




As discussed above, since the early 1990s Argentina has moved away from the poverty 
MDG. Table 4.1 reproduces poverty in the base year (1992) and presents three targets in 
terms of poverty reduction: 25%, 50% and 75% from the base year. The column for 50% is 
the MDG approved by United Nations. Argentina has to substantially reduce poverty from 
the present to 2015 to meet the MDG.  
 
Table 4.2 gives an idea of the size of this effort. To reach the USD2 poverty MDG (50% 
reduction in poverty measured with the USD2-a-day poverty line) with no changes in 
inequality, Argentina will have to grow at an annual rate of 9.5% until 2015, which is 
clearly an extremely unlikely scenario. Even to reach just a 25% reduction in poverty, the 
annual growth rate should be very high: 8.1%. The simulations generate similar values 
when using the official moderate and extreme poverty lines.
8  
 
In Table 4.3 we show the results of two alternative scenarios to reach the MDG. Under the 
label “redistribution 1” we present the uniform tax rate (on top of the existing tax system) 
needed to reach a given poverty-reduction target, assuming no growth, no inefficiencies, 
and equal expenditures per capita financed with the new tax. The magnitudes of the tax 
rates involved are again difficult to imagine to be implementable in practice. For instance, 
to meet the MDG for the moderate official poverty line, the incremental tax rate should be 
61.4%.  
 
Under the label “redistribution 2” we simulate transfers aimed at attaining a given poverty-
reduction target at the minimum fiscal cost, financed with a uniform tax levied only on the 
non-poor. The fiscal cost in this case is substantially lower. However, considering that this 
is a lower bound very unlikely to be reached, some values are still high. For instance, this 
well-targeted redistributive policy would need a tax rate of 14.9% to meet the MDG 
(assuming no growth).  
 
                                                 
8 Some people have incomes very close to zero. The income growth rates needed  to take them out of poverty 
are then high. The extreme case is for individuals with zero income. Most people under the USD1 a day in 
Argentina belong to this group. For this reason we do not present the (extremely high) growth rate needed to 
reduce poverty.    
  10Growth and redistribution can be combined to reduce poverty. The isopoverty curves of 
Figures 4.1 and 4.2 show these combinations for the four poverty lines under study, and the 
two alternative redistribution policies. Obviously, the combination of scenarios reduces the 
requirement of the growth and tax rates needed to reach a given poverty target. However, 
the values involved are still high. Take the case of the official moderate poverty in Figure 
4.1. Even with an initial tax rate of 20%, which is very high, the annual growth rate should 
be closer to 5%. With a still high incremental tax rate of 10%, the required annual growth 
rate increases to an unlikely 7.5%.  
 
If the policy could be perfectly targeted to reduce the headcount ratio, the growth and 
redistribution efforts could take values more likely to be achieved. A combined initial 
incremental tax rate of 5% and an annual growth rate of 3% will be enough to meet the 
MDG. If this second type of redistribution were possible, and the economy grew at 3%, the 




The case of Chile sharply contrasts with that of Argentina: since 1990 poverty has been 
substantially reduced. In fact, according to the discussion in section 2, Chile has already 
achieved the goal of halving poverty. For this reason the analysis for Chile differs from that 
for the other three Southern Cone countries. It would be senseless to simulate the growth 
and redistribution rates needed to meet the poverty MDG, since Chile has already met that 
goal. Instead of studying the target of halving poverty, we simulate changes that would 
allow achieving a more ambitious reduction in poverty: 60%, 70% and 80% from the 1990 
values. Table 4.4 suggests that Chile would be able to achieve these targets if the country 
could sustain the rates of poverty reduction of the 1990s. Poverty measured with the official 
poverty line dropped 18 points from 1990 to 2000. In the remaining 15 years to 2015 
poverty will have to fall another 9 points. As mentioned above, according to MIDEPLAN 
estimates poverty has already decreased almost 2 points since 2000.  
 
Table 4.5 gives an idea of the growth effort to meet these more ambitious targets. In order 
to reduce poverty 80% from the 1990 values Chile would need a distributionally neutral 
annual growth rate of around 3%. That rate climbs to 5.5% when poverty is defined with 
the USD 1 a day poverty line, which reflects the fact that reducing poverty from low levels 
only with generalized income growth is particularly hard.  
 
Table 4.6 shows the redistribution efforts needed to achieve the poverty reduction goals, 
assuming no income growth. Even in this stagnant scenario Chile could meet the goals with 
some moderate redistribution effort. The combinations of growth and redistribution of the 
isopoverty curves look likely to be attained. The figures suggest that with an annual growth 
  11rate of 2% and some targeting of the redistribution policy, the incremental tax rate needed 




As explained in section 2, and given data limitations, we assume based on the information 
available, that Paraguay has not made any progress in poverty reduction since 1990. Table 
4.7 shows the headcount ratio for the four different poverty lines in the base year (1990) 
and three targets for poverty reduction. Halving moderate poverty in Paraguay would 
require a reduction of 23.2 points in just 13 years.
9
 
Table 4.8 presents measures of the growth effort needed to reduce poverty. In order to 
achieve the USD2 poverty MDG, at fixed inequality levels, Paraguay will have to grow at 
an annual rate of 6.8% until 2015, an unlikely scenario given the past economic experience. 
Reducing poverty to 25% requires an annual growth of 2.7%, which seems more feasible. 
The results of the simulations are slightly more optimistic in terms of official poverty 
measures. For instance, to meet the MDG for the moderate official poverty line, the 
Paraguay’s economy will have to grow at an annual rate of 4.5%.  
 
In Table 4.9 we present the results for the two alternative redistributive scenarios. The 
simulation results of the first panel are hardly feasible in practice. For instance, to meet the 
MDG for the moderate official poverty line, the tax rate should increase 36.2%. With a 
completely targeted redistribution scheme (redistribution 2) the incremental tax rates are 
considerably smaller, although some are still high, considering the likely unfeasibility of 
this scenario. For instance, for the case of the moderate poverty line, the 50% MDG goal 
implies increasing the tax rate in 3.6%.   
 
Poverty reduction can be achieved by a combination of growth and redistribution policies. 
In Figures 4.5 and 4.6, the isopoverty curves present these combinations for the four 
alternative poverty lines, and the two redistribution policies. Considering the moderate 
official poverty line and the 50% MDG goal, with an incremental tax rate of 10% the 
annual growth rate should be close to 3%. In a situation where the public transfers could be 
ideally targeted to reduce the headcount ratio, the growth and redistribution efforts could 
take more feasible values. The combination of a 2% tax rate and an annual growth rate of 
1% will suffice to achieve the MDG. This objective will be even more likely if we consider 
a USD1-a-day poverty line.  
 
Uruguay  
                                                 
9 Official figures for 2002 have been challenged because of sample problems. However, the recently 
published values for poverty in 2003 confirm the increase in poverty after 2001. 
  12 
As explained above, and shown in Table 4.10, Uruguay lost more than a decade in the road 
to the poverty MDG. The efforts needed to reach the goal in time are then substantially 
greater than a decade ago. Table 4.11 shows that without changes in inequality, the 
Uruguayan economy would have to grow at almost an annual 4% from now to 2015 to meet 
the MDG in terms of official moderate poverty, which seems to be an ambitious scenario.   
 
The incremental tax rates in Table 4.12 are high in the first simulation and low in the 
second, especially when considering the international and extreme poverty lines. Figures 
4.7 and 4.8 shows some plausible combinations of growth and redistribution that can help 
Uruguay meet the MDG. For instance if the economy grows at an annual 3%, the required 
incremental tax rate would be around 5% for the moderate official poverty line and the 
USD2 a day poverty line. If the policy could be perfectly targeted to reduce the headcount 
ratio, the incremental tax would be extremely low.   
 
5.  Microeconometric simulations  
Rather than changing incomes as in the previous section we could change its determinants, 
that is, the factors that are believed to affect household income. The methodology has two 
key steps: estimating an income model, and simulating incomes using the estimated 
parameters. In this paper we estimate log linear models for individual earnings with the 
usual covariates of a Mincer equation (age, education, regions, area, sectors, formality) 
using Heckman maximum likelihood techniques.
10 The second stage of the methodology 
requires assuming some changes in the covariates, and simulating household incomes under 
the assumed distribution of covariates.  
 
The simulations are aimed at assessing the impact of changes in some economic variables 
on poverty and inequality. In particular, we want to evaluate the likely contribution of 
changes in some selected variables to the attainment of the poverty-reduction Millennium 
Development Goal. The impulse in each simulation is given by a change in an economic 
variable (e.g. years of education, unemployment rate). We do not model the process that 
generate the impulse, but take it as exogenous. Instead, we carefully trace the impact of the 
impulse on the household income of each individual, and then on measures of poverty and 
inequality.    
 
Simulation 1: Increase in years of education  
 
                                                 
10 Gasparini et al. (2003) and Bustelo (2004) estimate quantile regression models but did not find significantly 
different results from mean models. 
  13This exercise evaluates an increase in x years of education of the population aged 14 to 65. 
Years of education of each individual are augmented by x, with two exceptions: we do not 
allow youngsters to have more years of education than what is normal given their age, and 
we do not allow people to have more years of education than the maximum actually 
observed in the household survey. Once years of education are increased, we estimate labor 
income with the coefficients and residuals of the Mincer equation relevant to his or her 
gender. With the new estimated labor income, we recompute household income, and the 
measures of poverty and inequality.  
 
Simulation 2: Upgrading the educational structure 
 
We simulate two situations. In the first one, all the relevant population has at least primary 
school, which means that we change the educational status of those with no education or 
primary incomplete. In the second simulation we do not allow anybody to have less than 
secondary complete, with the exception of those workers younger than 19 years-old.  
 
Simulation 3: Reduction in unemployment rate 
 
This exercise assesses the impact of a reduction of x% in the unemployment rate. We 
randomly pick unemployed people and assign them the labor income estimated according 
to their characteristics and the parameters of the relevant Mincer equation.  
 
Simulation 4: Reduction in informality 
 
We divide the working population into two categories: informal workers are those salaried 
workers in small firms, non-professional self-employed, and familiar workers with zero 
income. We randomly choose some of these workers and pretend they move to the formal 
sector. We estimate their labor incomes by adding the coefficient of the dummy variable for 
formality in the labor income equation.  
 
Simulation 5: Reduction in agricultural employment  
 
This exercise simulates a reduction of x% in agricultural employment. People are moved 
from the agricultural to the manufacturing industry. The new labor incomes are computed 
using the dummies for the manufacturing sector in the relevant Mincer equation 
corresponding to the worker’s gender.  
 
Simulation 6: Reduction in the number of children  
 
  14We perform two types of simulations. In the first one the number of children (sons and 
daughters under 12) in a family is reduced by an integer x. In the second one, no family is 
allowed to have more than y children. Once we change the demographic structure, we 
recompute per capita or equivalized household income, and estimate poverty and 
inequality. We ignore the likely changes in labor market participation that may result after 
the reduction in the number of children in the household.  
 
6.  Results of the microsimulations  
In this section we present the main results of applying the methodology outlined in section 




Table 6.1 shows the poverty headcount ratio using different lines and the Gini coefficient 
over two income distributions under 13 alternative scenarios. Table 6.2 records the changes 
with respect to the values of the latest survey available (May, 2003). A strong result 
emerges from the tables: despite the fact that in all scenarios poverty falls, the changes fall 
short of the required drops to meet the MDG. The gaps are very large. For instance, while 
poverty has to decrease 43.7 points to reach the MDG poverty value with the official line, a 
generalized increase in 5 years of education could lead to a fall of approximately 14 points. 
This is not a small decline in poverty, but it is not enough to reach the goal after the 
dramatic increase in poverty in Argentina since the early 1990s.  
 
All the results in Argentina are affected by the fact that in our last available survey -May 
2003- poverty was close to the peak reached during the crisis of 2002. As the economy 
recovers poverty is expected to substantially fall. In fact, that has happened during 2004 
according to the results of the new EPH Continua (see Gasparini 2005, b). Poverty fell 
more than 10 points since May 2003. These figures reflect the strong effect of crisis and 
recoveries on poverty that can dwarf the impact of other policies or structural changes.  
 
The tables show that an increase of 1 year of education would have a rather modest impact 
on poverty. Since most workers have primary school, the first simulation of upgrading the 
educational structure (panel 2) has a small impact on poverty and inequality. In contrast, a 
shift to a situation where no worker has less than a high-school degree would imply an 
important drop in poverty (-8.3) and in inequality (-3.4). Again, although the fall in poverty 
is significant, it appears rather small compared to the drop needed to reach the MDG. The 
fall in inequality is relatively large. A drop of 3.4 points in the Gini would place inequality 
close to the levels prior to the Tequila crisis, although still far from the levels of non-crisis 
years of the 1970s and 1980s.  
  15 
A reduction of unemployment in 25% would not have a large impact on poverty (-2.2). 
Many unemployed people are not poor, so reducing unemployment would not affect 
poverty. In 2003 30% of the unemployed were not poor according to the official poverty 
line. Moreover, most poor unemployed people have characteristics (e.g. young, low 
education) that implies low wages if they find a job. These wages are often not enough to 
drive them out of poverty. Notice that the effect of a fall in unemployment on poverty 
would have been even smaller if we had assumed that, according to the law, benefits of the 
Programa Jefes de Hogar are eliminated once a person finds a job. A more ambitious 
reduction in unemployment (75%) obviously has a larger impact on poverty. The headcount 
ratio with the moderate poverty line would be reduced in more than 5 points.  
 
In panel 4 we simulate changes in the informality rate. The Mincer equations indicates that 
having a formal job increases earnings in 46% for men and 53% for women. In the more 
ambitious simulation (a reduction of the informality rate in 75%) poverty falls 4.3 points, 
which is not a very impressive figure. Again, many informal workers are not poor (42%), 
while many of those who are poor are anyway far from the poverty line to reach it with the 
wage increase associated to formality.   
 
Finally, the reduction in the number of children appears to have a significant impact on 
extreme poverty. For instance, a situation with 1 child less per household would imply a 
fall of more than 2 points in USD1 poverty, which implies a drop comparable to a reduction 
in unemployment in 75%, or an increase of 3 years of education. In contrast, the impact of 




As commented above Chile has already met the poverty MDG. In tables 6.3 and 6.4 we 
consider the target of reducing poverty 70% from the 1990 values. According to the results 
of the simulations reported in the tables a moderate increase in the educational level of the 
Chilean population can have a sizeable impact on poverty. A more ambitious scenario, e.g. 
an increase in 5 years of education, could be enough alone to reach the augmented MDG 
(70%). A program that help reaching full coverage of primary school would not have a very 
large impact on poverty, since attendance rates are already high. In contrast, full coverage 
in secondary school implies substantially larger impacts. The second panel in table 6.4 
shows that an upgrading of the educational structure such that no worker has less than 
secondary school implies, keeping all other things constant (e.g. returns to education), a 
sizeable reduction of nearly 7 points in official moderate poverty.  
 
  16Reduction in labor informality is often seen as an instrument for increasing incomes and 
reducing poverty. In Chile, however, when controlling for other characteristics, the formal 
dummy in the earnings equation is positive but small (in fact, not statistically significant). 
That means that moving people from the informal to the formal sector without changing 
their characteristics (e.g. education) will have a minor impact on poverty (see tables 6.3 and 
6.4). The same argument applies to the agricultural employment. Wages in that sector are 
lower than in the manufacturing industry. However, when controlling for other worker 
characteristics (basically, education) the differences vanish. Moving people from the rural 
areas to manufacturing industries in urban areas does not seem helpful for the reduction of 
poverty in Chile. Finally, reducing the number of children per household has at least a 




Paraguay has a long way to go in order to meet the poverty MDG. None of the scenarios 
simulated in tables 6.5 and 6.6 would be enough to reach the poverty target. However, the 
results suggest that some changes could have sizeable impacts on poverty rates. The 
educational upgrading of the population would be particularly effective. Keeping all other 
things constant, official moderate poverty could be reduced by 10 points with a strong 
educational policy that increases years of education by 5 (or that achieves full coverage of 
high-school).  
 
The reduction in unemployment, informality, and agricultural employment all have 
poverty-decreasing effects. The reduction in informality seems to be particularly effective. 
The demographic simulations also imply relative large reductions in poverty. In the two 




In the last decade Uruguay has moved away from the road to meeting the poverty MDG. 
Tables 6.7 and 6.8 show the likely direct impact on poverty reduction of changes in some 
socioeconomic scenarios that can help the country to advance towards the MDG.  Uruguay 
is one of the countries with the highest levels of education in Latin America. However, 
there is still a large fraction of the population with low educational levels and high returns 
to education. A generalized increase in 5 years of education could imply a fall in poverty of 
14 points, which could help Uruguay reaching the poverty MDG.  
 
Since most Uruguayans have a primary school degree, the challenge is to make high school 
universal. The second panel in table 6.8 shows that such policy would have a sizeable 
impact on poverty and inequality.   
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Unemployment was very high in 2003 (16.3% for adults). A generalized reduction in 
unemployment could generate large drops in poverty and inequality. However, the third 
panel in table 6.8 suggests that lowering unemployment would not be enough to reach the 
poverty MDG. Formal workers earn on average 60% more than informal workers, 
controlling for other characteristics. Reducing informality can have a relevant poverty-
reducing impact. A 25% reduction in informality, for instance could be associated to a fall 
in poverty of around 9 points (using the official poverty line).  
 
Finally, a reduction in the size of households could contribute to a reduction in income 
poverty (at least in the short-run). The contribution, however, seems small.  
 
7.  An assessment  
In this paper we use microsimulations techniques based on microdata from household 
surveys to provide rough estimates of alternatives scenarios needed to reach the poverty 
MDG in the Southern Cone countries.  
 
Table 7.1 summarizes the main results of the mechanical simulations of changing incomes. 
Argentina has moved away from the MDG since the early 1990s, which implies that today 
the probability for that country to meet the MDG is small. Argentina would require 
sustained high economic growth combined with a strong and targeted redistributive policy, 
a scenario that the country has not experienced in a very long time (if ever). Paraguay and 
Uruguay face similar situations, although the growth and redistribution efforts needed to 
reach the MDG are smaller. In contrast, Chile has already attain the poverty reduction 
MDG, and it is likely to further reduce poverty with small growth and redistribution efforts.   
 
The paper highlights the importance of acting in several directions in order to reduce 
poverty. High economic growth is certainly desirable, although in some countries it seems 
that it is not enough to reach the poverty MDG. On the other hand, redistributive policies 
help reducing poverty. However, the paper stresses that without growth the tax rate needed 
to meet the MDG in most countries is very high, which is politically difficult to implement, 
and also very likely detrimental to growth. The paper shows that efforts in targeting the 
transfers to the poor alleviate the need for high inefficient tax rates, and hence can make the 
whole package politically implementable and internally consistent.  
 
Table 7.2 summarizes the results of the microeconometric simulations. Increasing years of 
education has a sizeable effect on poverty, in particular achieving full attendance rates in 
high school. The reduction in unemployment and informality, and in household size would 
  18be particularly poverty-reducing in Argentina and Paraguay. However, none of these 
scenarios alone are enough to reach the poverty MDG in these countries.  
 
The methodology used in this paper should be viewed as just a preliminary evaluation of 
the direct impact of certain impulses on poverty and inequality. Increasing years of 
education or reducing the fertility rate have many other consequences than the ones 
analyzed in this paper. Knowing and computing all the interactions, theoretically and 
empirically, is far beyond the capacity of the social sciences in their current state. The 
simulations should then be taken just as one of many inputs in the evaluation of economic 
scenarios and policies. We believe they are relevant inputs that have an important 
advantage: they can be replicated and improved in concrete ways to provide more helpful 
results.     
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Table 2.1  
Poverty headcount ratio 
Argentina, Chile, Paraguay and Uruguay 
Latest             Changes
Base year Target survey From base To target
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v)
1. Argentina 1992 2015 2003 11 12
International
   USD1 a day 1.5 0.8 8.0 6.5 -7.2
   USD2 a day 4.9 2.5 23.5 18.6 -21.0
Official
   Extreme 4.5 2.3 25.9 21.4 -23.7
   Moderate 22.6 11.3 55.0 32.4 -43.7
2. Chile 1990 2015 2000 10 15
International
   USD1 a day 5.1 2.6 2.8 -2.3 -0.2
   USD2 a day 20.0 10.0 9.3 -10.7 0.7
Official
   Extreme 12.9 6.5 5.7 -7.2 0.8
   Moderate 38.6 19.3 20.6 -18.0 -1.3
3. Paraguay 1990 2015 2002 12 13
International
   USD1 a day 21.2
37.2
21.7
10.6 21.2 0.0 -10.6
   USD2 a day 18.6 37.2 0.0 -18.6
Official
   Extreme 10.9 21.7 0.0 -10.9
   Moderate 46.4 23.2 46.4 0.0 -23.2
4. Uruguay 1989 2015 2003 14 12
International
   USD1 a day 0.3 0.1 1.2 0.9 -1.0
   USD2 a day 1.9 0.9 5.7 3.8 -4.8
Official
   Extreme 2.8 1.4 2.8 0.1 -1.4
   Moderate 27.6 13.8 31.3 3.7 -17.5  
Source: own calculations based on microdata from household surveys.  
 
Table 2.2  
Annual required change in poverty (percentual points)  
from 2004 to 2015 to reach the poverty MDG  
Argentina, Chile, Paraguay and Uruguay 
         International PL          Official PL
USD1 USD2 Extreme Moderate
Argentina -0.6 -1.6 -1.8 -3.4
Chile Already met Already met Already met Already met
Paraguay -0.8 -1.4 -0.8 -1.8
Uruguay -0.1 -0.4 -0.1 -1.5  
Source: own calculations based on microdata from household surveys.  
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Actual and target poverty headcount ratio 
Argentina 
Base year  Target (% reduction of base year poverty) Latest            Changes
25% 50% 75% survey From base To MDG (iii)
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi) (vii)
1992 2015 2015 2015 2003 11 12
International
   US$1 a day 1.5 1.1 0.8 0.4 8.0 6.5 -7.2
   US$2 a day 4.9 3.7 2.5 1.2 23.5 18.6 -21.0
Official
   Extreme 4.5 3.4 2.3 1.1 25.9 21.4 -23.7
   Moderate 22.6 17.0 11.3 5.7 55.0 32.4 -43.7  
Source: own calculations based on microdata from the EPH.  
 
Table 4.2 
Annual distributionally-neutral growth rate  
from 2004 to 2015 needed to meet  





 US$1 a day 12.2 . .
 US$2 a day 8.1 9.5 17.0
Official
   Extreme 8.9 11.0 17.8
   Moderate 8.3 10.5 13.5  




Tax rate needed to meet a target poverty reduction 
Argentina 
               Redistribution 1               Redistribution 2
25% 50% 75% 25% 50% 75%
(iv) (v) (vi) (iv) (v) (vi)
International
 US$1 a day 11.4 14.3 14.3 0.2 . .
 US$2 a day 20.2 21.6 25.8 1.7 2.0 2.2
Official
   Extreme 23.5 25.4 28.8 2.3 2.6 2.9
   Moderate 58.5 61.4 63.8 11.6 14.9 18.6  
Source: own calculations based on microdata from the EPH.  
Note: Redistribution 1=tax rate t on all the population, and equal expenditures per capita. 
          Redistribution 2=tax rate t on all the non-poor, and minimum expenditures needed to reduce poverty  
                                       headcount ratio. 
 
  22 Figure 4.1  
Isopoverty curves 
Tax rate and annual distributionally-neutral growth rate  
needed to meet a target poverty reduction (under redistribution type 1) 
Argentina  
1 USD 2USD
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Source: own calculations based on microdata from the EPH.  
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Figure 4.2  
Isopoverty curves 
Tax rate and annual distributionally-neutral growth rate  
needed to meet a target poverty reduction (under redistribution type 2) 
Argentina 
1 USD 2USD
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Source: own calculations based on microdata from the EPH.  
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Table 4.4 
Actual and target poverty headcount ratio 
Chile 
Base year       Target (% reduction of base year poverty) Latest            Changes
60% 70% 80% survey From base To MDG (iii)
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi) (vii)
1990 2015 2015 2015 2000 10 15
International
   US$1 a day 5.1 2.0 1.5 1.0 2.8 -2.3 -1.3
   US$2 a day 20.0 8.0 6.0 4.0 9.3 -10.7 -3.3
Official
   Extreme 12.9 5.2 3.9 2.6 5.7 -7.2 -1.8
   Moderate 38.6 15.4 11.6 7.7 20.6 -18.0 -9.0  
Source: own calculations based on microdata from the CASEN.  
 
Table 4.5 
Annual distributionally-neutral growth rate  





 US$1 a day 1.4 3.0 5.5
 US$2 a day 0.5 1.5 3.2
Official
   Extreme 0.0 0.9 2.3
   Moderate 0.9 1.8 3.2  




Tax rate needed to meet a target poverty reduction 
Chile 
               Redistribution 1               Redistribution 2
60% 70% 80% 60% 70% 80%
(iv) (v) (vi) (iv) (v) (vi)
International
 US$1 a day 1.69 3.25 4.88 0.01 0.02 0.04
 US$2 a day 1.52 4.00 7.19 0.01 0.06 0.15
Official
   Extreme 0.03 2.04 4.60 0.00 0.01 0.05
   Moderate 4.62 8.51 12.76 0.08 0.29 0.63  
Source: own calculations based on microdata from the CASEN.  
Note: Redistribution 1=tax rate t on all the population, and equal expenditures per capita. 
          Redistribution 2=tax rate t on all the non-poor, and minimum expenditures needed to reduce poverty  
                                       headcount ratio. 
 
  25 Figure 4.3  
Isopoverty curves 
Tax rate and annual distributionally-neutral growth rate  
needed to meet a target poverty reduction (under redistribution type 1) 
Chile  
1 USD 2USD
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Source: own calculations based on microdata from the CASEN 2000  
 
  26Figure 4.4  
Isopoverty curves 
Tax rate and annual distributionally-neutral growth rate  





























0.0 1.0 2.0 3.0 4.0 5.0 6.0




























0.0 0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5 3.0 3.5






























0.0 0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5



























0.0 0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5 3.0 3.5





Source: own calculations based on microdata from the CASEN 2000  
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Table 4.7 
Actual and target poverty headcount ratio 
Paraguay 
Base year  Target (% reduction of base year poverty) Latest            Changes
25% 50% 75% survey From base To MDG (iii)
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi) (vii)
1992 2015 2015 2015 2003 11 12
International
   US$1 a day 21.2 15.9 10.6 5.3 21.2 0.0 -10.6
   US$2 a day 37.2 27.9 18.6 9.3 37.3 0.0 -18.7
Official
   Extreme 21.7 16.3 10.9 5.4 21.7 0.0 -10.9
   Moderate 46.4 34.8 23.2 11.6 46.4 0.0 -23.2  
Source: own calculations based on microdata from the EPH.  
 
Table 4.8 
Annual distributionally-neutral growth rate  
from 2003 to 2015 needed to meet  





 US$1 a day 3.5 11.0 .
 US$2 a day 2.7 6.8 20.6
Official
   Extreme 1.6 3.9 6.7
   Moderate 2.1 4.5 8.3  




Tax rate needed to meet a target poverty reduction 
Paraguay 
               Redistribution 1               Redistribution 2
25% 50% 75% 25% 50% 75%
(iv) (v) (vi) (iv) (v) (vi)
International
 US$1 a day 7.6 14.4 18.4 0.2 0.7 .
 US$2 a day 14.7 25.2 34.8 0.5 2.1 4.9
Official
   Extreme 7.6 14.7 20.0 0.2 0.6 1.5
   Moderate 23.6 36.2 45.8 1.0 3.6 7.7  
Source: own calculations based on microdata from the EPH (2002).  
Note: Redistribution 1=tax rate t on all the population, and equal expenditures per capita. 
          Redistribution 2=tax rate t on all the non-poor, and minimum expenditures needed to reduce poverty  
                                       headcount ratio. 
 
  28 Figure 4.5 
Isopoverty curves 
Tax rate and annual distributionally-neutral growth rate  
needed to meet a target poverty reduction (under redistribution type 1) 
Paraguay 
USD1 USD2
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  29Figure 4.6 
Isopoverty curves 
Tax rate and annual distributionally-neutral growth rate  
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Source: own calculations based on microdata from the EPH (2002).  
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Table 4.10 
Actual and target poverty headcount ratio 
Uruguay 
Base year  Target (% reduction of base year poverty) Latest            Changes
25% 50% 75% survey From base To MDG (iii)
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi) (vii)
1989 2015 2015 2015 2003 14 12
International
   US$1 a day 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.1 1.2 0.9 -1.0
   US$2 a day 1.9 1.4 0.9 0.5 5.7 3.8 -4.8
Official
   Extreme 2.8 2.1 1.4 0.7 2.8 0.1 -1.4
   Moderate 27.6 20.7 13.8 6.9 31.3 3.7 -17.5  
Source: own calculations based on microdata from the ECH.  
 
Table 4.11 
Annual distributionally-neutral growth rate  
from 2003 to 2015 needed to meet  





 US$1 a day 12.9 . .
 US$2 a day 5.5 7.1 10.4
Official
   Extreme 1.0 1.8 3.9
   Moderate 2.1 3.8 6.1  




Tax rate needed to meet a target poverty reduction 
Uruguay 
               Redistribution 1               Redistribution 2
25% 50% 75% 25% 50% 75%
(iv) (v) (vi) (iv) (v) (vi)
International
 US$1 a day 8.0 10.1 10.1 0.0 . .
 US$2 a day 10.7 12.4 15.0 0.2 0.2 0.3
Official
   Extreme 2.4 4.1 7.5 0.0 0.0 0.1
   Moderate 18.2 27.0 34.0 0.7 1.8 3.5  
Source: own calculations based on microdata from the ECH 2003.  
Note: Redistribution 1=tax rate t on all the population, and equal expenditures per capita. 
          Redistribution 2=tax rate t on all the non-poor, and minimum expenditures needed to reduce poverty  
                                       headcount ratio. 
 
  31 Figure 4.7 
Isopoverty curves 
Tax rate and annual distributionally-neutral growth rate  
needed to meet a target poverty reduction (under redistribution type 1) 
Uruguay 
1 USD 2USD
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  32Figure 4.8 
Isopoverty curves 
Tax rate and annual distributionally-neutral growth rate  
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Source: own calculations based on microdata from the ECH 2003.  
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Table 6.1 
Microsimulations  
Poverty headcount and the Gini coefficient  
Argentina  
                               Poverty headcount ratio       Gini coefficient
           International              Official Per capita Equivalized
USD 1 USD 2 Extreme Moderate income income
Actual values (2003) 8.0 23.5 25.9 55.0 0.520 0.498
MDG values (2015) 0.8 2.5 2.3 11.3
1. Increase in years of education
       Increase in 1 year 7.2 21.4 24.2 52.4 0.517 0.495
       Increase in 3 year 6.2 18.3 20.0 46.4 0.510 0.489
       Increase in 5 year 5.5 15.6 16.9 41.1 0.502 0.482
2. Upgrading in educational structure
       Nobody without primary school 7.5 21.9 24.2 54.0 0.515 0.492
       Nobody without secondary school 5.6 16.3 18.4 46.7 0.487 0.464
3. Reduction in unemployment rate
       25 % reduction 6.9 21.9 24.1 52.8 0.514 0.492
       50 % reduction 6.4 20.6 22.9 51.2 0.510 0.488
       75 % reduction 5.8 19.3 21.7 49.5 0.505 0.483
4. Reduction in informality rates
       25% reduction 7.4 22.2 24.4 53.6 0.517 0.494
       50% reduction 7.0 21.0 23.0 52.2 0.514 0.492
       75% reduction 6.7 19.9 22.0 50.7 0.510 0.487
5. Reduction in the number of children
       1 child less in each household 5.9 20.5 23.0 52.5 0.512 0.493
       No household with more than 2 children 6.1 20.1 22.8 53.3 0.509 0.489  
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Microsimulations  
Changes in poverty headcount and the Gini coefficient  
Argentina  
                        Poverty headcount ratio       Gini coefficient
           International              Official Per capita Equivalized
USD 1 USD 2 Extreme Moderate income income
Required change in poverty to meet the MDG -7.2 -21.0 -23.7 -43.7
1. Increase in years of education
       Increase in 1 year -0.8 -2.1 -1.8 -2.6 -0.3 -0.3
       Increase in 3 year -1.8 -5.2 -5.9 -8.6 -1.0 -0.9
       Increase in 5 year -2.5 -7.9 -9.1 -13.9 -1.9 -1.6
2. Upgrading in educational structure
       Nobody without primary school -0.5 -1.5 -1.7 -1.0 -0.5 -0.6
       Nobody without secondary school -2.3 -7.2 -7.6 -8.2 -3.3 -3.4
3. Reduction in unemployment rate
       25 % reduction -1.1 -1.6 -1.8 -2.2 -0.6 -0.6
       50 % reduction -1.5 -2.9 -3.0 -3.7 -1.1 -1.0
       75 % reduction -2.2 -4.2 -4.2 -5.4 -1.6 -1.5
4. Reduction in informality rates
       10% reduction -0.5 -1.2 -1.5 -1.4 -0.4 -0.4
       25% reduction -0.9 -2.5 -2.9 -2.8 -0.6 -0.6
       75% reduction -1.3 -3.6 -3.9 -4.3 -1.1 -1.1
5. Reduction in the number of children
       1 child less in each household -2.1 -2.9 -3.0 -2.4 -0.9 -0.5
       No household with more than 2 children -1.9 -3.4 -3.1 -1.7 -1.1 -0.9  
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Table 6.3 
Microsimulations  
Poverty headcount and the Gini coefficient  
Chile  
                               Poverty headcount ratio       Gini coefficient
           International              Official Per capita Equivalized
USD 1 USD 2 Extreme Moderate income income
Actual values (2000) 2.8 9.3 5.7 20.6 0.572 0.561
MDG values (2015) 1.5 6.0 3.9 11.6
1. Increase in years of education
       Increase in 1 year 2.6 8.3 5.1 18.2 0.584 0.575
       Increase in 3 year 2.3 6.6 4.2 13.5 0.611 0.604
       Increase in 5 year 2.0 5.3 3.4 10.3 0.616 0.611
2. Upgrading in educational structure
       Nobody without primary school 2.6 8.4 5.3 19.1 0.565 0.555
       Nobody without secondary school 2.0 6.0 3.8 13.7 0.538 0.526
3. Reduction in informality rates
       25% reduction 2.8 9.3 5.7 20.5 0.572 0.561
       50% reduction 2.7 9.2 5.6 20.3 0.571 0.561
       75% reduction 2.7 9.1 5.6 20.2 0.571 0.560
4. Reduction in agricultural employment
       10% reduction 2.8 9.3 5.7 20.6 0.572 0.561
       25% reduction 2.8 9.3 5.7 20.6 0.572 0.561
       50% reduction 2.8 9.3 5.7 20.6 0.572 0.561
5. Reduction in the number of children
       1 child less in each household 2.4 8.1 4.7 17.5 0.569 0.560
       No household with more than 2 children 2.6 8.6 5.1 19.3 0.570 0.560  
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Microsimulations  
Changes in poverty headcount and the Gini coefficient  
Chile  
                        Poverty headcount ratio       Gini coefficient
           International              Official Per capita Equivalized
USD 1 USD 2 Extreme Moderate income income
Required change in poverty to meet the MDG -1.3 -3.3 -1.8 -9.0
1. Increase in years of education
       Increase in 1 year -0.2 -1.0 -0.5 -2.4 1.2 1.3
       Increase in 3 year -0.5 -2.8 -1.5 -7.1 3.9 4.3
       Increase in 5 year -0.8 -4.1 -2.2 -10.3 4.4 4.9
2. Upgrading in educational structure
       Nobody without primary school -0.2 -1.0 -0.4 -1.5 -0.7 -0.7
       Nobody without secondary school -0.8 -3.4 -1.8 -6.9 -3.4 -3.6
3. Reduction in informality rates
       10% reduction 0.0 -0.1 0.0 -0.1 0.0 0.0
       25% reduction 0.0 -0.1 0.0 -0.3 -0.1 -0.1
       75% reduction -0.1 -0.2 -0.1 -0.4 -0.1 -0.1
4. Reduction in agricultural employment
       10% reduction 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
       25% reduction 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
       50% reduction 0.0 -0.1 0.0 -0.1 0.0 0.0
5. Reduction in the number of children
       1 child less in each household -0.4 -1.3 -1.0 -3.1 -0.3 -0.2
       No household with more than 2 children -0.2 -0.7 -0.6 -1.4 -0.1 -0.1  
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Microsimulations  
Poverty headcount  
Paraguay  
                               Poverty headcount ratio       Gini coefficient
           International              Official Per capita Equivalized
USD 1 USD 2 Extreme Moderate income income
Actual values (2003) 21.2 37.2 21.7 46.4 0.571 0.552
MDG values (2015) 10.6 18.6 10.9 23.2
1. Increase in years of education
       Increase in 1 year 20.9 35.9 20.5 44.8 0.572 0.553
       Increase in 3 year 19.6 33.5 17.5 40.1 0.574 0.556
       Increase in 5 year 18.8 31.5 15.5 35.9 0.576 0.559
2. Upgrading in educational structure
       Nobody without primary school 20.6 36.0 20.5 44.9 0.568 0.549
       Nobody without secondary school 18.1 29.5 15.4 35.6 0.566 0.549
3. Reduction in unemployment rate
       25 % reduction 20.2 35.8 21.1 45.2
       50 % reduction 19.6 34.2 20.3 43.2
       75 % reduction 18.6 32.1 19.3 41.7
4. Reduction in informality rates
       25% reduction 20.5 35.8 20.7 44.2 0.567 0.548
       50% reduction 19.2 33.3 18.8 41.3 0.561 0.542
       75% reduction 18.7 30.9 17.2 38.5 0.555 0.536
5. Reduction in agricultural employment
       10% reduction 21.1 37.0 22.0 46.5 0.574 0.556
       25% reduction 20.7 36.6 21.7 45.7 0.572 0.554
       50% reduction 20.0 35.4 20.6 44.6 0.572 0.554
6. Reduction in the number of children
       1 child less in each household 19.5 34.2 18.9 42.8 0.564 0.548
       No household with more than 2 children 18.5 33.2 18.5 42.4 0.557 0.544  
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Microsimulations  
Changes in poverty headcount  
Paraguay  
                        Poverty headcount ratio       Gini coefficient
           International              Official Per capita Equivalized
USD 1 USD 2 Extreme Moderate income income
Required change in poverty to meet the MDG -10.6 -18.6 -10.9 -23.2
1. Increase in years of education
       Increase in 1 year -0.3 -1.3 -1.2 -1.6 0.1 0.1
       Increase in 3 year -1.6 -3.7 -4.2 -6.3 0.3 0.3
       Increase in 5 year -2.4 -5.7 -6.2 -10.5 0.5 0.7
2. Upgrading in educational structure
       Nobody without primary school -0.6 -1.3 -1.2 -1.5 -0.3 -0.3
       Nobody without secondary school -3.1 -7.8 -6.3 -10.8 -0.4 -0.4
3. Reduction in unemployment rate
       25 % reduction -1.0 -1.5 -0.6 -1.2
       50 % reduction -1.6 -3.1 -1.4 -3.2
       75 % reduction -2.6 -5.1 -2.4 -4.7
4. Reduction in informality rates
       10% reduction -0.7 -1.5 -1.0 -2.2 -0.4 -0.4
       25% reduction -2.0 -3.9 -2.9 -5.1 -1.0 -1.0
       75% reduction -2.5 -6.3 -4.5 -7.9 -1.6 -1.6
5. Reduction in agricultural employment
       10% reduction -0.1 -0.3 0.3 0.1 0.3 0.3
       25% reduction -0.5 -0.6 0.0 -0.7 0.2 0.2
       50% reduction -1.2 -1.9 -1.1 -1.8 0.1 0.1
6. Reduction in the number of children
       1 child less in each household -1.7 -3.0 -2.8 -3.6 -0.6 -0.4
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Microsimulations  
Poverty headcount and the Gini coefficient  
Uruguay 
 
                               Poverty headcount ratio       Gini coefficient
           International              Official Per capita Equivalized
USD 1 USD 2 Extreme Moderate income income
Actual values (2003) 1.2 5.7 2.8 31.3 0.434 0.413
MDG values (2015) 0.8 2.5 2.3 11.3
1. Increase in years of education
       Increase in 1 year 1.1 5.2 2.4 23.2 0.435 0.415
       Increase in 3 year 0.9 4.2 2.0 19.8 0.440 0.423
       Increase in 5 year 0.7 3.7 1.6 17.1 0.447 0.432
2. Upgrading in educational structure
       Nobody without primary school 1.1 5.6 2.5 24.5 0.432 0.410
       Nobody without secondary school 0.7 3.5 1.6 17.8 0.407 0.387
3. Reduction in unemployment rate
       25 % reduction 1.1 5.3 2.3 24.0 0.431 0.410
       50 % reduction 0.9 4.8 2.1 22.8 0.427 0.406
       75 % reduction 0.7 4.3 1.8 21.5 0.424 0.403
4. Reduction in informality rates
       25% reduction 1.1 5.2 2.4 23.6 0.431 0.409
       50% reduction 1.0 4.7 2.1 22.3 0.428 0.407
       75% reduction 0.9 4.2 1.9 21.2 0.425 0.404
5. Reduction in the number of children
       1 child less in each household 0.9 4.7 1.9 26.6 0.427 0.409
       No household with more than 2 children 0.9 4.8 1.7 27.5 0.427 0.408  
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Table 6.8 
Microsimulations  
Changes in poverty headcount and the Gini coefficient  
Uruguay  
                        Poverty headcount ratio       Gini coefficient
           International              Official Per capita Equivalized
USD 1 USD 2 Extreme Moderate income income
Required change in poverty to meet the MDG -0.4 -3.3 -0.6 -20.0
1. Increase in years of education
       Increase in 1 year -0.1 -0.5 -0.4 -8.1 0.1 0.2
       Increase in 3 year -0.2 -1.5 -0.8 -11.5 0.6 1.0
       Increase in 5 year -0.4 -2.0 -1.2 -14.2 1.3 1.9
2. Upgrading in educational structure
       Nobody without primary school 0.0 -0.1 -0.3 -6.9 -0.3 -0.3
       Nobody without secondary school -0.5 -2.2 -1.2 -13.5 -2.7 -2.6
3. Reduction in unemployment rate
       25 % reduction -0.1 -0.4 -0.5 -7.3 -0.3 -0.3
       50 % reduction -0.3 -0.9 -0.7 -8.5 -0.7 -0.7
       75 % reduction -0.5 -1.4 -1.0 -9.8 -1.0 -0.9
4. Reduction in informality rates
       10% reduction -0.1 -0.5 -0.4 -7.7 -0.3 -0.3
       25% reduction -0.2 -1.0 -0.7 -9.0 -0.6 -0.6
       75% reduction -0.3 -1.5 -1.0 -10.1 -0.9 -0.9
5. Reduction in the number of children
       1 child less in each household -0.2 -1.0 -0.9 -4.7 -0.7 -0.4
       No household with more than 2 children -0.2 -1.0 -1.1 -3.8 -0.7 -0.4  
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Table 7.1 
Annual distributionally-neutral growth rate and incremental tax rates  
needed to meet the poverty reduction MDG 
Annual            Redistribution
growth rate 1 2
Argentina
   USD 2 a day 9.5 21.6 2.0
   Moderate official 10.5 61.4 14.9
Chile
   USD 2 a day Already met Already met Already met
   Moderate official Already met Already met Already met
Paraguay
   USD 2 a day 6.8 25.2 2.1
   Moderate official 4.5 36.2 3.6
Uruguay
   USD 2 a day 7.1 12.4 0.0
   Moderate official 3.8 27.0 1.8  
 
Table 7.2 
Changes in the poverty headcount ratio  
USD 2 a day poverty line  
Argentina Chile Paraguay Uruguay
MDG=50% MDG=70% MDG=50% MDG=50%
Required change in poverty to meet the MDG -21.0 -3.3 -18.6 -3.3
1. Increase in years of education
       Increase in 1 year -2.1 -1.0 -1.3 -0.5
       Increase in 3 year -5.2 -2.8 -3.7 -1.5
       Increase in 5 year -7.9 -4.1 -5.7 -2.0
2. Upgrading in educational structure
       Nobody without primary school -1.5 -1.0 -1.3 -0.1
       Nobody without secondary school -7.3 -3.4 -7.8 -2.2
3. Reduction in unemployment rate
       25 % reduction -1.6 -1.5 -0.4
       50 % reduction -2.9 -3.1 -0.9
       75 % reduction -4.2 -5.1 -1.4
4. Reduction in informality rates
       10% reduction -1.2 -0.1 -1.5 -0.5
       25% reduction -2.5 -0.1 -3.9 -1.0
       75% reduction -3.6 -0.2 -6.3 -1.5
5. Reduction in agricultural employment
       10% reduction 0.0 -0.3
       25% reduction 0.0 -0.6
       50% reduction -0.1 -1.9
6. Reduction in the number of children
       1 child less in each household -2.9 -1.3 -3.0 -1.0
       No household with more than 2 children -3.4 -0.7 -4.0 -1.0  
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